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Abstract
We examine the role of seller bidding and reserve prices in an inﬁnitely repeated independent-private-value
(IPV) ascending-price auction. The seller has a single object that she values at zero. At the end of any
auction round, she may either sell to the highest bidder or pass-in the object and hold a new auction next
period. New bidders are drawn randomly in each round. The ability to re-auction motivates a notion
of reserve price as the option value of retaining the object for re-auctioning. Even in the absence of a
mechanism with which to commit to a reserve price, the optimal “secret” reserve is shown to exceed zero.
However, despite the inﬁnite repetition, there may be signiﬁcant value to the seller from a binding reserve
price commitment: the optimal binding reserve is higher than the optimal “secret” reserve, and may be
substantially so, even with very patient players. Furthermore, reserve price commitments may even be
socially preferable at high discount factors. We also show that the optimal “phantom” bidding strategy
for the seller is revenue-equivalent to a commitment to an optimal public reserve price.
JEL: D44, D82.
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We examine the role of seller bidding and reserve prices in a repeated Independent Private Values
(IPV) auction model. There is a single object for sale, and an ascending-price auction may be
held in each of an inﬁnite number of periods. At the end of any period, the seller can either
sell to the highest bidder or pass-in the object for re-auctioning in the next period. Bidders are
assumed to arrive randomly over time, according to a Poisson process. The ability to re-auction
ensures that, with probability one, the object will eventually be sold. Hence, the seller’s optimal
reserve price is not based on the direct consumption value of the good to the seller (normalized
to zero), but on the option value of retaining the object for subsequent re-sale. This repeated
auction structure also captures some of the features of internet auctions for items such as used
computer parts, software, etc.
For the IPV framework, it was established by Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981)
that standard one-shot auctions (such as ﬁrst- or second-price sealed-bid auctions) with a reserve
price strictly above the seller’s valuation of the object will maximize expected revenue within
a wide class of mechanisms. In particular, the seller gains by withholding the object in some
situations in which gains from trade exist, in order to extract a greater share of the surplus in
trades with higher-value buyers. Clearly, such selling mechanisms generate an ineﬃciently low
volume of trade from a Social Planner perspective: only auctions with a reserve price equal to the
seller’s value are eﬃcient.
These results assume an exogenous, and commonly known, number of bidders, n, but the
optimal reserve price is independent of n when all bidder valuations are drawn from the same
distribution (the case considered here). Moreover, the second-price auction with reserve remains
optimal even if bidders are uncertain of n (McAfee and McMillan (1987-a)). Indeed, provided
bidders have symmetric posteriors over the number of rivals they face, these authors show that
the ﬁrst-price auction with reserve will also remain optimal.1
1 However, a “no reserve” auction may be optimal if the number of bidders is determined by endogenous entry
in the presence of participation costs incurred before bidders learn their values for the object: see McAfee and
McMillan (1987-b), Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1987,1993), and Levin and Smith (1994). In these models, the private
gain from further entry corresponds to that of society (and the seller). Since the seller has no reason to discourage
entry, the reserve price loses its only appeal. Menezes and Monteiro (2000) show that the value of a reserve is
1More crucial, however, is the underlying assumption that the seller is able to commit to
withhold the object from the bidders if the reserve is not met. While it is arguable that such
commitment may be implementable within a given auction round, it is implausible to suppose
that the seller can commit not to re-auction the object. By explicitly allowing for re-auctioning,
we re-examine the value of a (temporary) commitment to a reserve price.
We ﬁnd that binding reserves continue to be valuable to the seller, much as being the ﬁrst mover
in a Stackelberg duopoly game is preferable to playing the Cournot game. In fact, both the optimal
“secret” reserve — the one employed in the absence of commitment where any announcement by
the seller is interpreted by bidders as “cheap-talk” — and the optimal binding (or “public”) reserve
are both higher than in the one-shot case. This is because the option value of the object exceeds
its direct consumption value. The optimal “secret” reserve is thus raised to this higher option
value level; while the optimal binding also increases, because the opportunity cost of not selling
in the current round is reduced.
However, in practice, reserve prices are sometimes kept secret. For example, Horstmann and
LaCasse (1997) argue that a common feature of many auctions, namely the seller’s refusal to sell
to the high-bidder, might be interpreted as evidence of the existence of a secret reserve.2 These
authors explain the existence of a secret reserve price as a signalling device about the (common)
value of the object being sold. Such information could not be credibly transmitted to buyers by a
publicly announced reserve price because of adverse selection. Instead the seller uses costly delay
as a signalling device.3
We oﬀer an alternative rationalization for the rejection of high bids. A rejected high bid may
indicate that the high bidder was in fact the seller. In the absence of a commitment technology,
“phantom” bidding allows the seller to replicate the eﬀect of a binding public reserve. Indeed,
we show that seller bidding (or shilling) results in the same expected revenue as a binding public
restored when bidders learn their value for the object before making their entry decision. In particular they show
that the optimal auction again involves setting a reserve price above the seller’s valuation.
2 Ashenfelter (1989) reports signiﬁcant percentages of high-bid rejections in wine and ﬁne art auctions. Jones,
Menezes and Vella (1996) report high-bid rejection rates for wool auctions in Australia.
3 Vincent (1995) argues that a secret reserve price might be used to increase bidder participation at the auction
in a common value environment. His model, however, cannot explain why high bids are often rejected once an
auction takes place.
2reserve. This equivalence may at ﬁrst seem surprising, since shilling gives the seller far greater
strategic ﬂexibility than a public reserve. In eﬀect, shilling allows the seller to re-set the reserve
price at any stage during the auction. We show that this added ﬂexibility, however, adds no value
for the seller. This contrasts with a view held by many that phantom bidding helps the seller.
Indeed, eBay does not allow the seller to bid in its internet auctions. Similarly, the New South
Wales State Government in Australia has moved to end phantom bidding by requiring bidders to
register and by limiting to one the number of bids a Vendor is allowed to make.
In our repeated auction framework, the seller’s optimal reserve price, and the value of com-
mitment, are natural generalizations of the one-shot results. However, the welfare conclusions are
quite diﬀerent. Because the good must eventually be sold, the question of allocative eﬃciency
asks whether it is sold too quickly or too slowly. We show that the sale is made too quickly in the
absence of a reserve price commitment (unless the seller bids on her own account). That is, the
“secret” reserve price is too low. This contrasts with the one-shot scenario, in which the “secret”
reserve — which is just the seller’s direct consumption valuation of the good — is eﬃcient. With
Uniformly distributed bidder valuations, we show that the optimal public reserve remains too high
relative to the social optimum. However, unlike the one-shot case, it may be socially preferable
to the “secret” reserve at high discount factors.
In the sequel we also consider the more general problem in which the seller chooses the duration
of each auction round, as well as the reserve price. In eBay auctions, for example, the seller may
c h o o s ea3 ,5 ,7o r10 day format. Unsurprisingly, if reserve prices are “secret”, then the optimal
length of a round of the auction is ﬁnite and strictly positive. For the “public” reserve auctions,
we identify two countervailing forces at work. Shorter auctions reduce the time costs of the selling
mechanism. However, longer auctions raise the probability of two or more bidders arriving, and
hence increase the competition amongst bidders. In the limit, as the length of each round goes to
zero, the likelihood that the object will be sold at the reserve goes to one: the auction collapses
to a posted price mechanism. Simulations reveal that a zero-length auction (i.e. price posting) is
in fact optimal when bidder values are Uniformly distributed.
Related Literature
3The existing literature on repeated auctions has focussed on the case of long-lived bidders.
For example, McAfee and Vincent (1997) consider an inﬁnitely repeated, second-price IPV model
in which the same n bidders participate in each round. As discount rates converge to unity, a
version of the Coase conjecture takes hold, and the reserve price converges rapidly to zero over
time. With bidder valuations distributed Uniformly on [0,1], McAfee and Vincent show that the
value of commitment to a reserve price is seriously undermined by the inability to commit not to
re-auction.
Burguet and Sákovics (1996) obtain a contrary result. They show that optimal reserves may be
high (relative to the utility of the object to the seller) and valuable in a two-stage, ﬁrst-price IPV
model when buyers face participation costs, even with no discounting. They oﬀer no justiﬁcation,
however, for their assumption that the seller can credibly commit not to re-auction the object
after the second stage. Moreover, the seller is further assumed not to impose any reserve in the
second-stage auction, despite having had access to a suitable commitment technology in the ﬁrst
period to implement a ﬁrst-period reserve.
Haile (2000) also has a two period model where re-auctioning is assumed not to be possible
after the second stage. Instead, a re-sale market opens in the second period, in which the seller
commits not to participate. Since buyers are uncertain about their true valuations when they bid,
this re-sale market is always active with some positive probability. Haile’s main results concern
the eﬀect of the re-sale market on optimal bidding strategies in the (second-price) auction, but he
also shows that high reserves may be valuable.
Therefore, when bidders are (inﬁnitely) long-lived, and the seller can never credibly commit
not to re-auction, it seems that reserve prices lose much of their value to the seller. However, the
case of short-lived bidders — where each round attracts a new cohort of participants — has, to the
best of our knowledge, not been studied. As we demonstrate below, with short-lived bidders, the
Coasian logic vanishes and optimal reserves are typically even higher than in the one-shot case.
This optimal reserve, in the absence of a suitable commitment technology, can be implemented
by seller bidding, but seller bidding cannot improve on the optimal public reserve auction.
Thus, our model dispenses with the untenable assumption of a seller commitment not to re-
4auction the object, but (a) implies a high value of commitment to a reserve price; and (b) provides
a possible explanation for the phenomena of objects being passed-in in the absence an announced
reserve, even when a costless technology exists to bind the seller the reserve.
The model is presented in the next section. Some general results are presented in section 3,
and in section 4 we derive (by simulation) the optimal secret and public reserve prices when bidder
valuations are Uniformly distributed, as well as the optimal length of each auction round. Longer
proofs and calculations appear in the Appendix.
2 The model
An auction may be held in each of an inﬁnite number of discrete periods. Within any given round,
there is one unit of time4 , with elapsed time described (in the obvious fashion) by the Uniform
density on [0,1].W el e tt denote the elapsed time in the current round. No time elapses between
the end of one auction round and the start of the next. Although we ignore any ﬁxed monetary
cost of conducting an auction, there is one cost to re-auctioning in our model: any bidder present
at time t =1in some round is assumed no longer to be present at time t =0of the next.5
There are inﬁnitely many potential buyers. Bidders arrive according to a Poisson process with





In this setting, buyers arrive one at a time within any given auction period: multiple simultaneous
arrivals occur with probability zero. Buyers’ values are determined by independent draws from a
common distribution F with strictly positive density f on [0,1]. A buyer’s own value is private
information; but F is common knowledge.
We assume that bidders play “myopically” (e.g. that each auction round attracts a diﬀerent
pool of bidders). The seller, however, has regard for the future beyond the current round, and a
4 We shall relax this assumption, by making the duration of auction rounds endogenous, in section 3.6.
5 In internet auctions, for example, where automated proxy bidding is common, there may be a standing bid at
t =1without the bidder being on-line. Also, the subsequent auction may potentially be conducted at a diﬀerent
site, with no “forwarding address” posted for bidders in the previous round.
5(continuous) rate of time preference ρ > 0. The seller values the object at zero.
We consider cases where a publicly announced reserve may or may not be enforceable, and the
seller may or may not be able to submit phantom bids. This yields the following four alternative
auction mechanisms:
1. ‘Cheap-talk’ reserve price (CTRP) — announced reserves are not enforceable, and phantom
bids are precluded.
2. Public (binding) reserve price (PRP) — announced reserves are enforced, but phantom bids
are precluded.
3. Seller Phantom Bidding (with cheap-talk reserve) — announced reserves are not enforceable,
but phantom bids are allowed.
4. Seller Phantom Bidding and public binding reserve price — publicly announced reserves are
enforced, and phantom bids are allowed.
Descriptions of the operation of these alternate mechanisms, the corresponding strategy choices
available to the seller, and the strategies of the bidders who arrive during the course of the auction
are outlined in the subsequent subsections.
2.1 Cheap-talk-reserve-price
At time t =0the standing bid is automatically set to zero. The seller may, if she wishes, announce
a price at which she purports to be willing to sell the object if the standing bid at the end of
the current period has reached that amount. But this announcement in no way restricts her later
choice of action.6 Seller (phantom) bids are precluded.
When the ﬁrst bidder arrives he may post a bid to become the new standing bidder. As each
subsequent bidder arrives, he engages in an open ascending auction with the standing bidder until
one drops out and the other becomes the new standing bidder. Bidders may not re-enter the
a u c t i o no n c et h e yh a v ed r o p p e do u t . 7
6 Porter (1995) reports that 12.7% of U.S. oﬀ-shore oil and gas leases auctioned between 1970 and 1979 were
passed in, despite the announced reserve being exceeded.
7 This assumption is innocuous. See Section 3.
6We assume that the bidding process between the current standing bidder and the new arrival
consumes zero time. Thus, our framework captures an environment in which bilateral bidding
contests consume amounts of time that are negligible relative to the length of each auction round,
and also relative to the arrival rate of bidders.8
At the end of each period (t =1 ), the seller may either accept the current standing bid and
sell the object immediately to the high-bidder, thereby ending the repeated auction; or reject the
standing bid and pass-in the object for re-auctioning. We preclude seller negotiations with bidders
a tt h ec o n c l u s i o no fa na u c t i o n .
2.2 Public-(binding-)reserve-price
At time t =0the seller chooses the initial standing bid which is taken to be an enforceable reserve
price. The standing bid changes only if a bidder arrives who is prepared to bid above this reserve.
The auction otherwise continues as in the cheap-talk-reserve-price scenario.
2.3 Seller-phantom-bidding
At time t =0the standing bid is set to zero. The auction proceeds as in the cheap-talk-reserve-
price scenario, except that at any time (including t =0 ) the seller may imitate the arrival of a new
buyer and bid on her own account. Since negotiation between bidders and seller are precluded by
assumption, if a phantom bid stands at the end of the auction round, the object is automatically
passed-in for re-auction next period.
2.4 Seller-Phantom-Bidding with public binding reserve price
This scenario combines a binding public reserve with phantom bidding by the seller. It is redun-
dant, however, as the ability to submit phantom bids eﬀectively undermines the enforceability
of the reserve price: the seller can always trump a standing bid to force a re-auction. Hence,
this scenario is equivalent to the seller-phantom-bidding (without an enforceable public reserve)
8 An example of an environment that ﬁts this description is “proxy bidding” in the popular eBay on-line auction.
Arriving bidders submit their maximum bids to automated “proxy bidders”. These proxy bidders maintain the
bidder in the standing bidder position until the maximum bid level is exceeded. They also implement the bidding
strategy at light-speed.




Because bidders have independent private values, participate in at most one auction round, and
the auctions have a second-price structure, optimal bidding strategies are straightforward to de-
termine. There is a weakly dominant strategy which is to bid up to one’s valuation. For example,
bidders could submit maximum bids equal to their values to proxy bidders in an eBay auction.
Let us be a little more precise. The optimal bidding strategy is not aﬀected by the presence or
otherwise of the seller as a phantom bidder. Phantom bids have the same consequences for bidders
as “genuine” rival bids: if a phantom bid stands at t =1 , the object is passed in for re-auctioning.
Suppose that a new bidder arrives and ﬁnds a standing bidder in residence. Since re-entry is
precluded, it is optimal for the arriving bidder to remain in the bidding war with the standing
bidder unless his (the new arrival’s) valuation is exceeded.9 In fact, even if re-entry within the
current round were allowed, there would be nothing for the arrival to gain by doing otherwise.
He might drop out of the current bidding war “early”, but will always ﬁnd it optimal to re-enter
before t =1and bid until his valuation is reached (unless it has already been exceeded in the
meantime). The assumption that bidders may not re-enter avoids the unnecessary complication
of these timing issues.10
Next, consider the decision of an arrival in the absence of a standing bidder. If a public reserve
has been posted, this is the de facto standing bid, so the new bidder will either depart (if his value
is no greater than this), or bid the reserve (plus epsilon) to become the standing bidder.
9 If the new arrival’s value is no greater than the standing bid, he departs without bidding.
10 Some authors, such as Roth and Ockenfels (2001), have observed a tendency for “sniping”, or last-minute
bidding, in on-line auctions. However, the use of proxy bidding in eBay auctions avoids this. Other on-line auctions
employ “soft” endings to the same eﬀect. Auctions may be extended for short periods (say, 5 minutes) until no
further activity is recorded; a sort of virtual “going...going..gone!”. This, too, restores the usual second-price logic,
and eliminates any incentive to “snipe”. See Lucking-Reiley (2000).
8In a cheap-talk-reserve-price auction, if no standing bidder is in residence, the eﬀective standing
bid is zero. However, if bidders anticipate that the seller has a non-zero secret reserve r,aﬁrst
arrival will optimally bid the secret reserve (plus epsilon) if his value exceeds r. If he did not, he
will expect to “lose” the auction, and fail to acquire the object at a price less than his valuation.
If his value is no greater than r, then he has several optimal courses of action. He may choose
not to bid, or to submit any bid less than r. None of our results depends upon which option the
bidder chooses in this situation, as will be clear.
Finally, consider an arriving bidder who wins a bidding war with the standing bidder in a
cheap-talk-reserve-price auction. If the bidder believes that the seller has a secret reserve of r,
and the previous standing bidder dropped out of the bidding war before bidding reached r, then,
as in the previous case, the new bidder will submit one further bid equal to r (plus epsilon). This
may happen, for example, if the previous standing bidder was the ﬁrst arrival, and had a value
less than r (see the previous paragraph).
In summary, let r denote the reserve price anticipated by bidders: r is the public reserve for
auctions in which public reserves are posted and binding; or the anticipated secret reserve in a
cheap-talk-reserve-price format. A bidder with value v ∈ [r,1] will submit bids in [r,v] just high
enough to meet the reserve and remain the standing bidder. If bidding exceeds v they will drop
out of the auction. Bidders with values in [0,r) expect zero surplus from participation in the
auction. They may choose not to bid, or else submit a bid in [0,r).
3.2 The seller’s decision problem
Observe that the seller’s problem is stationary: it looks the same at the start of each auction
round. Leaving aside seller bidding for the moment, the seller’s problem is to choose a reserve
price, or acceptance rule, for each auction period. Because of the stationarity of the problem, we
a s s u m et h a tt h es a m er e s e r v ep r i c ei sa p p l i e di ne a c hp e r i o d .
In a cheap-talk-reserve-price auction, the reserve is secret, so we may think of the seller deciding
on her acceptance rule at t =1 : she may accept or reject the standing bid at that time.11 With
11 There is also no advantage from separately announcing the reserve, as it has no signalling value in the IPV
context, and is thus ignored by bidders: it is “cheap talk”.
9a public reserve price, the acceptance rule is set at t =0 . Moreover, the reserve will aﬀect the
bidders’ strategies, as described above. In each case, however, the institutional assumptions we
have made impose the restriction that the acceptance rule will take the form of a cut-oﬀ (reserve)
price, r, such that the standing bid at t =1is accepted iﬀ it is at least r. This restriction is
innocuous.
If seller bidding is allowed, the seller has a much more complex strategy space. In addition to
setting a (secret) reserve, she also chooses a bid function that may depend on the elapsed time in
the current round, the reserve, and the level of the last genuine bid submitted. By stationarity,
we may assume that the seller employs the same bidding strategy in any round, but the range
of potential bid functions is still very large. Fortunately, there exists an optimal seller bidding
strategy with a very simple form. We derive this strategy in subsection 3.5.
3.3 The value of a public reserve
Let us ﬁrst compare, from the seller’s point of view, the cheap-talk-reserve-price format to an
auction with a public-(binding-)reserve-price. Is there value to the seller from committing to a
(public) reserve price?
For a cheap-talk-reserve-price (CTRP) auction, the seller’s strategy involves choosing an ac-
ceptance price (or reserve), r, being the lowest price at which she is prepared to sell the object in
any round. This choice will depend on the bidders’ strategies, which in turn depend on their ex-
pectation of the reserve price. We impose the usual equilibrium conditions that players maximize
their expected payoﬀs at all points in the game, and beliefs about rival strategies are correct.
Let v0(r) be the sellers’ discounted expected payoﬀ when she chooses a reserve price of r,
and all bidders correctly anticipate r and play a best response. Equilibrium in the CTRP game
therefore requires that
r = v0(r) (1)
Equation (1) says that the seller’s reserve is equal to the value of re-starting the auction game,
given the bidders’ optimal responses to this reserve. If bidding fails to reach v0,i ti sb e t t e rt o
pass in the object; and accepting a bid above v0 is preferable to re-auctioning the object.
10Proposition 1 There exists an equilibrium secret reserve, and all solutions to (1) are interior to
[0,1].
The formal proof appears in the Appendix, in which an explicit expression for v0(r) is derived,
but the basic idea is straightforward. First, continuity of v0 guarantees the existence of a ﬁxed
point. Second, it is obvious that v0(0) > 0 and v0(1) = 0. That is, the seller expects a non-zero
surplus in a “no reserve” auction; and setting a reserve of r =1ensures that the probability of
achieving a sale in any given round is zero.
For the public-(binding-)reserve-price (PRP) scenario, the seller’s strategy again consists of
choosing an acceptance price (reserve) r. However, r must now be stated publicly and committed




Again, continuity of v0 ensures the existence of a solution to (2).
The seller can clearly do no worse in the PRP auction, since the value of the CTRP auction
is v0(r) evaluated at an r that satisﬁes (1). The seller would rather choose the best anticipated
reserve, than choose a reserve that is anticipated and best given this ﬁxed bidder expectation.
H e n c ew eh a v e :
Proposition 2 From the seller’s point of view, the public-reserve-price scenario is preferable to
the cheap-talk-reserve-price scenario.
In section 4 we shall quantify the value a reserve price commitment for the case of bidders with
Uniformly distributed values.
In general, the optimal PRP (“public”) reserve will be higher than the equilibrium CTRP
(“secret”) reserve price. Raising a reserve is more beneﬁcial if done publicly, since it induces
higher bids from high-value arrivals. Conversely, reductions in reserve are best kept secret, to
raise the chances of a sale without encouraging bid reductions from sole high-value bidders. This
creates a tendency for reserves to be higher when public and binding, than when they are secret.
More precisely:











This matches the familiar expression for the optimal reserve in a one-shot IPV auction — see, for
example, Riley and Samuelson (1981, Proposition 3) — except that the seller’s valuation of the
object, v0(r∗), is now endogenous: it is the “option value” of retaining the object for re-auctioning.
Since v0(r∗) > 0, the optimal public reserve is higher than in the one-shot case, since the seller’s
opportunity cost of not trading in any given round is greater than the consumption value of the
object. With short-lived bidders, the Coasian logic of McAfee and Vincent (1997) is reversed.
Recall that in a one-shot auction, the optimal public reserve is independent of the number n
of bidders. However, r∗ will, in general, vary with λ, the average number of arrivals per round,
since λ aﬀects the option value v0(r∗).12 However, this dependence vanishes as the seller becomes
increasingly myopic, and r∗ converges to the usual one-shot reserve price.13
3.4 The surplus maximizing reserve price
In a one-shot auction, any non-zero reserve price is surplus reducing, since there is some chance
that no trade occurs. Hence, privately optimal reserve price commitments are necessarily too high
from a social eﬃciency point of view. With a repeated auction, this is no longer the case. Unless
the reserve price is set at unity — which is precluded by Propositions 1 a n d3—t h eo b j e c tw i l l
12 For the Uniform case, see Figure 1.
13 Using equation (22) from the Appendix, we may deﬁne
V (r) ≡ lim
ρ→∞ eρv0(r)=
λ[1 − F(r)]r + λ2 R 1
r zf(z)[1− F(z)]eλ[F(z)−F(r)] dz
eλ[1−F(r)]
to be the (undiscounted) expected revenue from a one-shot auction with public reserve r.S i m p l ea l g e b r ag i v e s
V 0(r)=0 ⇐⇒ r =
1 − F(r)
f(r)
Therefore, the optimal public reserve in a one-shot auction with random bidder arrivals is independent of λ.
12sell with probability one. The eﬃciency issue concerns whether the sale occurs too quickly or too
slowly.
To be more precise, let us consider a Social Planner who must respect all the exogenous
constraints of the auction mechanism. The Social Planner discounts at the same rate as the seller.
At the end of any period, the Planner may therefore choose to allocate the object to any one of
the arrivals during that period, or else wait one more round. We assume that the Social Planner
observes the values of all arrivals during the current round, but does not know the values of future
arrivals.14 Which allocation rule maximizes the discounted expected value of total surplus?
As usual, stationarity implies that the Planner’s rule will consist of a cut-oﬀ, r, such that the
good is allocated to the highest value arrival during the current period if and only if the highest
value exceeds r. Note, therefore, that the Social Planner’s cut-oﬀ is a valuation, while the seller’s
is a bid level. However, in each case, the good is allocated in the current round if and only if a
bidder arrives whose valuation exceeds the cut-oﬀ. In this sense, they are directly comparable for
the purposes of determining the allocative eﬃciency of the auction.
Let vS(r) denotes the Planner’s value function. The Social Planner problem is of the “optimal
stopping” variety. In each period, a maximum surplus is drawn at random according to some
density h on [0,1], with associated cumulative distribution function H.15 The Planner’s problem
is to determine a cut-oﬀ level of surplus at which to stop the process. In general:
1
δ
vS(r)=[ 1 − H(r)]E[z |z ≥ r]+H(r)vS(r) (4)
(where δ = e−ρ). Thus, using the fact that
d
dr
E[z |z ≥ r]=
−h(r)
1 − H(r)







14 This seems to us the natural benchmark against which to assess the allocative eﬃciency of the auction
mechanism. Alternatively, one may justify the lack of Social Planner omniscience by supposing that bidders do not
receive their values for the object until they arrive. This value may depend, for example, on actions taken prior to
arrival.
15 In the following calculations we treat these as continuous distributions for simplicity. Of course, in the auction
example they are not. In particular, there is an atom of size e−λ at zero. However, we shall shortly verify that the
same results obtain in this case.
13Therefore, v0
S(r)=0iﬀ vS(r)=r. The Planner should allocate the object whenever the highest
value arrival exceeds the continuation value, and this cut-oﬀ should also maximize the value
function.








1 − δe−λ[1−F(r)] (5)














That is, ˆ r maximizes vS(r) if and only if ˆ r solves
vS(r)=r (6)
Hence, the presence of atoms in the distribution of maximum surplus does not aﬀect the basic
optimal stopping logic.
We may immediately conclude:
Proposition 4 The CTRP auction sells the object too quickly from a social eﬃciency point of
view. That is, if r∗∗ and ˆ r solve (1) and (6) respectively, then r∗∗ < ˆ r.
Proof. It is clear that v0 (r∗∗) <v S (r∗∗), since the seller must share the (strictly positive)
expected surplus with the buyer, while the Social Planner does not. Therefore, if ˆ r ≤ r∗∗ we have
vS (ˆ r)=ˆ r ≤ r∗∗ = v0 (r∗∗) <v S (r∗∗).
But this contradicts the fact that ˆ r maximizes vS (r). ¤
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is easy to see. Consider an auction round that ends with a
high bid equal to r, which in turn is equal to the high bidder’s valuation. Accepting the current
16 Details are in the Appendix.
14high bid earns r for both the seller and the Social Planner, while passing-in earns the former v0(r)
and the latter vS(r). Since the Social Planner anticipates the whole expected surplus from future
trade, while the seller only anticipates a fraction — that is v0 (r) <v S (r) — the Social Planner is
more patient. The CTRP auction sells too quickly.
It is not so clear whether the optimal public reserve is too high or too low. Let R(r) denote the
expected revenue generated in an auction with (binding) reserve r,a n dl e tS (r) be the expected
total surplus from such an auction. We also deﬁne Π1 (r) to be the probability that no bidder
with value at least r arrives during the auction. Then, using the expressions in the Appendix, one
easily shows that:
v0
S(r) ∝ [1 − δΠ1(r)]δS0(r)+δ2Π0
1(r)S(r)
v0
0(r) ∝ [1 − δΠ1(r)]δR0(r)+δ2Π0
1(r)R(r).
The second term in each expression reﬂects the “option” value of not selling in the current round
as a result of raising the reserve. The ﬁrst term reﬂects the impact of an increased r on current
period returns (surplus or revenue respectively).
Since Π0




This reﬂects the extra patience of the Social Planner due to her higher “option” value.
On the other hand S0(r) ≤ 0, since raising r lowers the chances of an allocation being made in
any period, without aﬀecting the expected value of the highest-value arrival. Raising r therefore
reduces the expected realized surplus within any given round, and is a cost to the Social Planner.
F o rt h es e l l e r ,h o w e v e r ,t h e r ea r eg a i n sa sw e l la sl o s s e sf r o mr a i s i n gr. First, there is the reduced
probability of sale, as for the Social Planner. However, since the seller does not always get all the
surplus from a sale, the opportunity cost is smaller than for the Social Planner. Second, raising
r increases the seller’s portion of surplus when exactly one bidder arrives with a value above the
reserve.17
17 By direct calculation:
R0(r)=S0(r)+λ[1 − F(r)][1 − (1 − r)λf(r)]e−λ[1−F(r)].
15The overall eﬀect is ambiguous: the optimal public reserve price may either be too high or too
low from a surplus-maximization point of view. In section 4, we show that the public reserve is
too high when bidder values are Uniformly distributed.
3.5 Public reserves versus seller bids
A seller bid submitted at time t has the same eﬀect on bidder behavior as imposing a public
reserve at t equal to the phantom bid. The ability to make phantom bids is therefore equivalent
to the ability to set a public reserve at t =0and alter it continuously throughout the auction.
Hence, the seller-phantom-bidding format is the best of the three, and it follows that the seller
is happy to forego access to a reserve price commitment technology provided she can bid in the
auction.
Of course, many auctions, including on-line eBay auctions, have rules against seller bidding.
The extent to which these rules are enforceable, especially in the context of virtual auctions, is
highly debatable. Surprisingly, however, in our framework these regulations are entirely redundant,
as the seller is completely indiﬀerent between the seller-phantom-bidding and public-reserve-price
formats. The additional strategic freedom aﬀorded by seller bidding — essentially, the freedom to
use a “ﬂexible reserve” — adds no additional value.
Graham, Marshall and Richard (1990) showed that in a one-shot, second price, IPV auction,
if the seller has the opportunity to bid once all genuine bidding activity has ceased, her optimal
bid is independent of the standing bid. We extend this result to our framework. The incentive
to phantom bid at t is shown to be independent of both the current standing bid and t,e v e n
though additional bidding activity may occur in (t,1] and there is the possibility of re-auctioning
the object.
Before stating this result formally, let us ﬁrst deﬁne a suitable value function for a seller-
phantom-bidding auction. Once again, by the stationarity of the problem, the value function will
not depend on the period, but it will depend on the time t that has elapsed in the current period.
Therefore, if t units of time have elapsed in the current round, and there is a standing bid b,w el e t
ˆ vt(r,b) denote the seller’s expected continuation value when she nominates a public reserve price
16of r at t and uses an optimal continuation strategy thereafter.
We shall make use of the following “regularity assumption”:
Assumption 5 The value function ˆ vt(r,b) is diﬀerentiable in r for any (t,b) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1) and




is a suﬃcient condition for ˆ r ∈ (b,1) to maximize ˆ vt(·,b) on (b,1].





Under this regularity condition we obtain the following equivalence result.
Proposition 6 Under Assumption 5, the seller-phantom-bidding and public-reserve-price auction
formats generate the same ex ante expected revenue for the seller. That is:
max
r∈[0,1]
ˆ v0(r,0) = max
r∈[0,1]
v0(r) (8)
3.6 Optimal auction length
Until now, we have normalized the length of auctions to one unit of time. However, on-line
auctions often allow sellers to choose their duration, at least within some bounds. It is therefore
of interest to endogenize the length of auction rounds.
Let T denote this parameter. The seller’s value function becomes18
v0(r,T)=
λT [1− F(r)]r +( λT)2 R 1
r zf(z)[1− F(z)]eλT[F(z)−F(r)] dz
e{ρ+λ[1−F(r)]}T − 1
(9)
It is clear that all of the preceding results apply (pari passu)f o ra n yg i v e nT.T h eq u e s t i o nw e
address here is what value of T will the seller choose under each of the cheap-talk-reserve-price
and public-reserve-price formats?
18 Equation (9) follows by straightforward adaptation of the calculation of v0 (r) in the Appendix.
17By familiar logic, a seller who uses a public reserve will choose (r,T) to maximize v0(r,T).
With a secret reserve, for any T, r must satisfy
r = v0(r,T) (10)
Assuming that this has a unique solution r(T) for each T, T will be chosen to maximize v0(r(T),T).
We shall allow T to be chosen from R+. That is, duration is inﬁnitely divisible, and T =0
is a possible choice. With regard to the latter assumption, what does it mean to run an auction
lasting zero units of time? Observe that the value function (9) is not even deﬁned when T =0 .




However, an alternative, more intuitive, deﬁnition is the following. Since the probability of two
or more simultaneous arrivals is zero, instantaneous re-auctioning (T =0 ) means that the object
is oﬀered for sale to the ﬁrst person willing to pay the reserve price, r. The object will therefore
be sold to the ﬁrst arriving bidder whose value exceeds r, and the sale price will be exactly r.A
zero-length auction is simply a posted price mechanism. If it is a zero-length CTRP auction, the
posted price r is “cheap talk”, while the reserve in a zero-length PRP auction is a posted price to






where Pr(t) is the density associated with the arrival time of the ﬁrst bidder with a valuation
that exceeds r. Since bidders with values in excess of r arrive according to a Poisson process with
mean λ[1 − F(r)], it is well known that arrival times will have the exponential density
Pr(t)=λ[1 − F(r)]e−λt[1−F(r)].
18Therefore:




= rλ[1 − F(r)]
·
e−ρt−λ[1−F(r)]t





ρ + λ[1 − F(r)]
(12)
Re-writing (12), we have:
ρv0(r,0) = λ[1 − F(r)][r − v0(r,0)] (13)
This expression is a Bellman equation familiar from the literature on optimal search.19 The
imputed instantaneous rate of income accumulation, ρv0(r,0), is equal to the instantaneous arrival
rate of bidders with value above r, λ[1 − F(r)], multiplied by the net beneﬁt from such an arrival,
r − v0(r,0).
Let us ﬁrst observe that deﬁnitions (11)a n d( 12) are equivalent. Using deﬁnition (12) for




λ[1 − F(r)]r + Tλ2 R 1




{ρ + λ[1 − F(r)]}T
e{ρ+λ[1−F(r)]}T − 1
¸







λ[1 − F(r)]r + Tλ2 R 1
r zf(z)[1− F(z)]eλT[F(z)−F(r)] dz
rλ[1 − F(r)]
= 1 + lim
T→0
Tλ2 R 1
r zf(z)[1− F(z)]eλT[F(z)−F(r)] dz
rλ[1 − F(r)]
=1 .
19 See, for example, Mortensen (1986).
19N o wt h a tw eh a v ed e ﬁned the value function v0(r,T) on [0,1]×R+ we may address the question
of the optimal auction duration. For the case of a cheap-talk-reserve-price auction it is clear that
T =0cannot be optimal:20
Proposition 7 For a cheap-talk-reserve-price auction, some T>0 will be chosen.
Proof. When T =0 , the equilibrium condition (10) is
r =
rλ[1 − F(r)]
ρ + λ[1 − F(r)]
,
which is satisﬁed if and only if r =0 .T h u s
v0(r(0), 0) = 0.
Since we already know that v0(r(1),1) > 0, the result follows. ¤
When the seller cannot commit to her posted price, and she faces a “search cost” of ﬁnding
another buyer (the expected delay until the next arrival), the only credible price announcement
is zero. Absence of commitment deprives the seller of any eﬀective market power. To acquire any
surplus from trade, she must hold an auction long enough that there is some non-zero probability
of buyer competition.
However, for a public-reserve auction, matters are not so clear. The seller does not need to use
non-zero auction length to overcome her price commitment problem. Of course, longer rounds do
increase buyer competition and hence seller surplus as before, but they also delay trade. It is not
clear ap r i o r iwhich T will provide an optimal balance between these two eﬀects. However, the
case in which F is the Uniform distribution shows that zero-length auctions (price posting) may
be optimal with a public reserve (see section 4).
4 The case of Uniformly distributed values
Our objective in the present section is to identify the optimal secret and public reserve prices when
F is the Uniform distribution. We may then determine the value (to the seller) from a commitment
20 Readers familiar with the literature on search will recognise the logic underlying Proposition 7 as a version of
the so-called Diamond paradox (Diamond (1971)).
20to a public reserve. We also compute the social costs of the alternative auction formats, and the
optimal auction length.
For the case of Uniformly distributed bidder valuations, f(z)=1 , F(z)=z. Hence, as we













Straightforward calculations reveal that
v0
0(r) ≷ 0
⇔ 2δe−λ(1−r) ≷ [2δ − λ(1 + δ)] + 2λr (15)
(where δ ≡ exp(−ρ)).
4.1 Optimal public reserve
Consider the public-reserve-price scenario.
Proposition 8 There is a unique optimal reserve in the public-reserve-price auction for any
(λ,δ) ∈ R++ × (0,1). This optimal reserve lies in (0.5,1), converging to 0.5 as λ → 0 or δ → 0.
Proof. Existence of an optimal public reserve, and the fact that any such reserve price is strictly
less than 1, are guaranteed by Proposition 3. Uniqueness of the optimal public reserve follows
from the facts that the left-hand side of (15) is convex in r, while the right-hand side is linear.
The lower bound on the optimal reserve comes from equation (3) in Proposition 3, which implies
r∗ > 1 − r∗
and hence r∗ > 0.5.
Letting r =0 .5 in (15) gives
2δ
eλ/2 ≷ (2 − λ)δ (16)
Both sides of this expression converge to 2δ as λ → 0,o rt o0 as δ → 0.T h i sp r o v e st h a tr =0 .5 is
optimal in each of these limiting cases, since we have already established the existence of a unique
interior maximizer of v0(r). ¤
21In a one-period version of this auction game, it is well-known that r =0 .5 is the optimal
(enforceable) reserve for any λ > 0 (i.e. for any number of bidders). Hence, if δ → 0 the optimal
reserve must converge to r =0 .5. A similar result obtains in a model in which the same bidders
vie for the object in each round — see McAfee and Vincent (1997, p.250). However, in their model,
the optimal reserve in period 1 converges to 0.5 from below as δ → 0 (ibid., Figure 1(b)). When
facing the same set of bidders each period, the inability to commit not to re-auction the object
places downward Coasian pressure on the reserve.
If δ > 0 and re-auction is possible, the seller has an incentive to raise her reserve above r =0 .5,
since she receives a positive value even if the object is passed in. However, as the expected number
of bidders in any given round goes to zero, the value of this re-auction option becomes negligible,
so the optimal reserve again converges on r =0 .5.
Conversely:
Proposition 9 For any δ ∈ (0,1), the optimal public reserve converges to r =( 1+δ)/2 as
λ →∞ ;w h i l ef o ra n yλ > 0, the optimal public reserve converges to r =1as δ → 1.
Proof. The left-hand side of (15) goes to zero as λ →∞ . The right-hand side will only go to
zero if r → (1 + δ)/2.21
As δ → 1,( 15) converges to the condition
eλr ≷ eλ [1 − λ(1 − r)].
The left-hand side of this expression is strictly increasing and strictly convex, rising to eλ as r → 1.
The right-hand side is linear and strictly increasing in r, also rising to eλ as r → 1.W h e nr =1
both sides have slope λeλ. Therefore, the two sides are equal if and only if r =1 . ¤
Contrast this result with McAfee and Vincent (1997, p.251 and Figure 1(d)). In their model,
with values drawn from the Uniform distribution on [0,1], the optimal ﬁrst period reserve also
rises with the number of bidders, n, but converges to the static solution, r =0 .5.I no u rm o d e l ,
a higher arrival rate λ augments the incentive to pass-in the object and search for higher value
21 This puts an upper bound on the optimal reserve price (for given δ), since it is intuitive that r is increasing in
λ. Indeed, if r>(1 + δ)/2, then the right-hand side of (15) strictly exceeds 2δ (for any λ > 0), while the left-hand
side is no greater than 2δ for any r ≤ 1 and λ > 0.
22bidders. This reduces the pressure on the seller to sell in any given round, and pushes the reserve
further and further above its optimal one-shot value. In the McAfee and Vincent model, with the
same bidders each period, increasing the number of bidders raises the reserve for a quite diﬀerent
reason. Higher n raises the pressure on bidders to bid early, allowing the seller to raise her reserve.
In the limit, the competitive pressure on bidders completely overcomes the Coasian dynamic, and
the optimal one-shot reserve is achieved.
In contrast to our Proposition 9, McAfee and Vincent (1997, p.251 and Figure 1(b)) obtain
that the optimal reserve declines with increases in δ in their model.
4.2 Optimal secret reserve
Let us now turn to properties of the cheap-talk-reserve-price auction. The ﬁrst observation is
the following:
Proposition 10 There exists a unique equilibrium reserve in the cheap-talk-reserve-price auction
for any (λ,δ) ∈ R++ × (0,1).
Proof. Use v0 = r in (14) and re-arrange the resulting expression to get
eλ [z +2 δ − δλ]=δez [2 + λ − z] (17)
where z = λr. The left-hand side of (17) is linear and strictly increasing in z, while the right-hand
side is strictly increasing and strictly convex. Hence there will be at most two solutions to (17) in
z ∈ [0,λ]. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for two solutions is that the LHS≥RHS at z =0





In fact, one may verify that (18) fails for any λ > 0. Hence, the equilibrium secret reserve is
unique. ¤
Proposition 3 implies that the optimal secret reserve will be strictly smaller than the optimal
public reserve. Furthermore, it is immediate from (17) that:
Proposition 11 For any λ > 0, the equilibrium secret reserve r → 0 as δ → 0.
This is just convergence to the optimal secret reserve in the one-shot auction.
23Figure 1: Optimal public reserve price
Figure 2: Equilibrium secret reserve price
244.3 Numerical results
4.3.1 The case T =1
Although explicit solutions for the optimal secret and public reserves are elusive, we may easily
obtain them numerically. Figures 1 and 2 give the optimal reserves for a wide range of (δ,λ)
values.22
The ﬁgures illustrate the behavior of the reserves for limiting values of the parameters. In
relation to Proposition 8, we observe that convergence of the optimal public reserve to 0.5 as
λ → 0 is comparatively slow. Figure 1 uses λ values that are bounded below by λ =0 .1.O n e
veriﬁes Proposition 8 by taking λ values down to λ =0 .005,a si nF i g u r e3 .
Similarly, Proposition 9 is also obscured by the scale Figure 1. Indeed, it is clear that Propo-
sitions 8 and 9 imply “extreme” behavior of the surface near (δ =1 ,λ =0 ) , with convergence to
a non-smooth contour.
Figure 3: Optimal public reserve for low λ values
Figure 4 plots rPRP − rCTRP,w h e r erPRP denotes the optimal public reserve, and rCTRP
22 Recall that δ = e−ρ.
25is the equilibrium secret reserve price. This is the increment in the reserve as a result of public
announcements binding the seller.
Figure 5 illustrates the value of this commitment to a public reserve. It plots the gain from












We observe that this value falls sharply as the average number of arrivals per period, λ,r i s e s .T h e
percentage gain is below 10% (for any δ)b e f o r eλ reaches 5. Gains also tend to diminish with
rises in δ, though much more slowly. In this sense, the inability to commit not to re-auction the
object does devalue the commitment to a reserve price, but we do not see the dramatic decline in
value observed by McAfee and Vincent (1997) in the case of long-lived bidders.
Since public reserves are higher than secret reserves, on average it will take longer to sell an
object using the public-reserve-price format. The probability of concluding a sale in any given
period is 1 − Π1(r), which is equal to 1 − e−λ(1−r) in the Uniform case. Let p(r,λ) denote this
quantity. It is decreasing in r for any λ, as one would expect. Figure 6 indicates the increment in









The expected number of periods until a sale is achieved is p(r,λ)−1. Figure 7 indicates the
expected extra delay (in numbers of periods) from using the public-reserve-price format rather







Finally, let us compare the optimal public reserve to the socially optimal reserve price. When




1 − re−λ(1−r) − e−λ(1−r) ¡
r − λ−1¢ª
1 − δe−λ(1−r) (19)
Figure 8 reveals that the optimal public reserve is too high. It graphs the diﬀerence between the
optimal public reserve and the maximizer of (19).
23 This diﬀerence depends on δ,a sw e l la sλ,s i n c erCTRP and rPRP depend on both parameters.
26Figure 4: Public reserve less secret reserve
Figure 5: Value of commitment
27Figure 6: Extra per period sale probability from a secret reserve
Figure 7: Expected extra delay from a public reserve
28Since we know (Proposition 4) that the equilibrium secret reserve price is too low, it is of
interest to determine which auction format comes closest to achieving the socially optimal expected
surplus. Are reserve price commitments socially desirable? Figure 9 provides the answer: it plots
the diﬀerence between vS(rCTRP) and vS
¡
rPRP¢
(as a percentage of the latter). One observes
that, for suﬃciently high discount factors, the public reserve is relatively more eﬃcient.
4.3.2 Endogenous T
For the special case in which F is Uniform, Figure 10 plots the value function v0(r,T) when ρ =0 .1
and λ =3 , using (9).




as a function of T (again assuming that values are Uniformly distributed, ρ =0 .1 and λ =3 )
we obtain Figure 11. Furthermore, straightforward calculations reveal that v0(r,0) is maximized
when
r =( 1 + θ) −
p
θ(1 + θ) (21)
24 We obtain the same conclusion for all other parameter values that we have tried. In fact, one may show that
dv0 (r∗(T),T )
dT
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
T↓0
< 0 (20)








2r − 1 − e−ρT
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divide through by T2 and simplify to obtain
−[ρ + λ(1 − r)]
"























Taking limits as T → 0 we get
−[ρ + λ(1 − r)]2λ ≷ 0
Since ρ + λ(1 − r) > 0, (20) follows.
29Figure 8: Optimal public reserve less socially optimal reserve.











30(where θ = ρ/λ). Hence, with Uniformly distributed valuations, the optimal public-reserve-price
auction has T =0and reserve price (21). We therefore have a complete characterization of the
optimal auction (within the scenarios considered here) for the Uniform case.
Figure 10: v0(r,T) when F Uniform, ρ =0 .1 and λ =3
The optimality of T =0in a public-reserve-price-auction should be interpreted with care.
It relies on our assumption that there is no delay between auction rounds, and no other ﬁxed
(monetary) cost to running another auction. In reality, at least one, and probably both, of these
assumptions will be violated. For example, eBay charges sellers a small fee for each auction they
run. Time or other costs of running many auctions will provide pressure to increase T.
On the other hand, the optimality of price-posting (in the presence of commitment) does not
undermine the relevance of the model for the analysis of internet auctions. On eBay, for example,
sellers have the option of posting a “Buy It Now” price. In the absence of a standing bid (above
the reserve), if an arriving bidder oﬀers the “Buy It Now” price, it is automatically accepted and
the auction is cancelled.
Figure 12 illustrates v0(r(T),T), the value of a cheap-talk-reserve-price auction as a function
of T. This has a maximum at an auction length around 2.
31Figure 11: Auction value with a public reserve
Figure 12: Auction value with a secret reserve
325C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The model presented here oﬀers a natural generalization of the one-shot auction that allows for
re-auctioning. As δ → 0 the familiar one-shot results are recovered. However, the generalized
framework is useful in a number of respects.
First and foremost, it will be rare that sellers will be able to credibly commit not to re-auction
the object. In particular, internet auction sites allow a seller to re-auction quickly and at negligible
cost.
Second, the potential to re-auction allows for a more realistic analysis of reserve prices. This
potential generates a non-zero option value of retaining the object, and hence raises both “secret”
and “public” reserves. However, with our short-lived bidders, a substantial value from a reserve
price commitment remains. We are also able to conﬁrm that seller bidding oﬀers no advantage
over a reserve price commitment in our setting.
Third, re-auctioning signiﬁcantly alters the welfare properties of diﬀerent auction mechanisms.
“Secret” reserves are too low for allocative eﬃciency; and reserve price commitments may be
socially preferable.
Finally, by modelling the bidder arrival process and endogenizing auction duration, our frame-
work also nests price posting as a limiting case (when T → 0). One may then observe the relative
value of price versus time commitments for revenue generation. In the absence of price commit-
ments, the logic of the Diamond paradox implies value in a commitment to T>0,a st h i sw i l l
increase buyer competition. However, with Uniformly distributed bidder valuations and reserve
price commitments, price posting is actually optimal for the seller.
Appendix




where Π1(r) is the probability that, in any given period, the object is passed in, and R(r) is the
expected revenue from any given auction round. Thus, Π1(r) is equal to the probability that
33no bidder arrives with a value in [r,1]. The process of arrival of bidders with values in [r,1] is
easily shown to be Poisson with mean λ[1 − F(r)],s oΠ1(r)=e x p( −λ[1 − F(r)]). The expected













where Π2(r)=λ[1− F(r)]exp(−λ[1− F(r)]) is the probability that the auction yields r —w h i c h
is just the probability that exactly one bidder arrives with a valuation in [r,1]. The function gn
2
is the density of the second order statistic from n random draws from the distribution F.I n
particular:
gn






2(z)/n!)zd zis the expected value of the second-highest arrival
with a value above r (the random variable defaulting to zero along sample paths for which there



























λ[1 − F(r)]r + λ2 R 1
r zf(z)[1− F(z)]eλ[F(z)−F(r)] dz
eρ+λ[1−F(r)] − 1
(22)
Notice that v0(0) > 0, v0 (1) = 0 and v0 (r) is a continuous function. Hence from the intermediate
value theorem it follows there exists an ˆ r ∈ (0,1) for which ˆ r − v0 (ˆ r)=0as required. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 25 Let




25 We thank Rhema Vaithianathan for correcting an error in a previous “proof.”
34and
D(r)=eρ+λ[1−F(r)] − 1.
Recall that v0 (r)=N (r)/D(r) (see equation (22)). An optimal public reserve must therefore





















if and only if (3) holds.
From (1), (2) and (3): r∗∗ = v0 (r∗∗) ≤ v0(r∗) ≤ r∗. It follows that r∗ ≥ r∗∗, with equality
if and only if 1 − F(r∗)=0 . But the latter is equivalent to r∗ =1 , and Proposition 1 rules out
r∗∗ =1 . Therefore, r∗∗ <r ∗ < 1. Finally, r∗ >r ∗∗ and Proposition 1 imply r∗ > 0. ¤






is the probability that there is no arrival with a value above r during a period of length 1,a n d
S(r) is the expected total surplus generated in the current round (given that the object has not














1(z)=nf(z)Fn−1(z) is the pdf of the highest of n random draws from distribution F.26
26 We observe that S(r) ≥ R(r),s ovS(r) ≥ v0(r), as one would expect. The diﬀerence represents the buyers’
expected surplus from an auction with reserve r.



















to be the marginal incentive to raise the phantom bid from r to r + dr at time t when there is a













where Pr(t + x|t) is the density describing the random variable x, being the elapsed time until
the arrival of the ﬁrst bidder with a value in excess of r,g i v e nn os u c ha r r i v a l sb yt.T h ea r r i v a l
process of bidders with values above r is Poisson with mean λ[1− F(r)],s o :


















Let r∗ denote the optimal public reserve in a public-reserve-price auction. We claim that an
optimal seller bidding strategy is to counter-bid r∗ at any t at which there is a standing bid b<r ∗.
36To verify our claim, it suﬃces to show that gt(r∗)=0for all t when the seller adopts this strategy.
It then follows that the optimal seller bidding strategy is equivalent to conducting an optimal
public-reserve-price auction.27
However, it is natural to suspect that gt(r∗) might strictly decrease with t. If there is less
time remaining in the current round, the seller may wish to bid less aggressively. Nevertheless,
one may show that in fact gt(r∗) is independent of t. In particular, given a standing bid of r∗ at













since the seller’s strategy ensures a continuation value of v0(r∗) from the start of the next round.




which is satisﬁed iﬀ r = r∗ (recall equation (3)). Therefore, the optimal public reserve remains
the optimal counter-bid at t =1 .S ogt(r∗) does not decline strictly with t.
More generally, gt(r∗) may be decomposed as follows:
gt(r∗)=Γt(r∗) − e−{ρ+λ[1−F(r∗)]}(1−t) f(r∗)
[1 − F(r∗)]
v0(r∗).
The ﬁrst term, Γt(r∗), represents the change in the expected revenue from the current round,
while the second reﬂects the change in the probability that the object will not be sold in the
current round. In the event of no sale, the seller’s continuation strategy ensures a continuation
value of v0(r∗). To determine Γt(r∗), note that revenue is unaﬀected provided at least one new
bidder arrives in (t,1] with a value above r∗. The impact on revenue is only non-zero if there are








27 In particular, the calculations here are based on the assumption that the seller makes a single counter-bid
for each (b,t), rather than engaging in a bidding war with the standing bidder. The independence of the optimal
counter-bid with respect to the standing bid b implies that nothing is lost by excluding this alternative form of
seller bidding strategy.





Hence, the condition gt(r∗)=0is independent of t,a n di ss a t i s ﬁed when r∗ is the optimal public
reserve (recall equation (3)).
Hence, an optimal strategy for the seller is to submit an optimal phantom bid at time t =0 ,
and play no further part in that round. This implies (8) and completes the proof. ¤
Derivation of Equation 14. For the case of Uniformly distributed bidder valuations, f(z)=
1, F(z)=z. Hence, (22) becomes:
v0(r)=
λ(1 − r)r + λ2 R 1
r z (1 − z)eλ(z−r) dz
eρ+λ(1−r) − 1




z (1 − z)eλ(z−r) dz = λ
Z 1
r
z (1 − z)λeλ(z−r) dz
= λ
h






(1 − 2z)λeλ(z−r) dz
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